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Jean Baudrillard 
Two Essays
Translated by Arthur B. Evans
1. Simulacra and Science Fiction
There are three orders of simulacra: 
(1) natural, naturalistic simulacra: based on image, imitation, and
counterfeiting. They are harmonious, optimistic, and aim at the reconstitution,
or the ideal institution, of a nature in God’s image.
(2) productive, productionist simulacra: based on energy and force,
materialized by the machine and the entire system of production. Their aim
is Promethean: world-wide application, continuous expansion, liberation of
indeterminate energy (desire is part of the utopias belonging to this order of
simulacra). 
(3) simulation simulacra: based on information, the model, cybernetic play. 
Their aim is maximum operationality, hyperreality, total control. 
To the first order corresponds the imaginary of the utopia. To the second,
SF in the strict sense. To the third...is there yet an imaginary domain which
corresponds to this order? The probable answer is that the “good old” SF
imagination is dead, and that something else is beginning to emerge (and not
only in fiction, but also in theory). Both traditional SF and theory are destined
to the same fate: flux and imprecision are putting an end to them as specific
genres. 
There is no real and no imaginary except at a certain distance. What
happens when this distance, even the one separating the real from the
imaginary, begins to disappear and to be absorbed by the model alone?
Currently, from one order of simulacra to the next, we are witnessing the
reduction and absorption of this distance, of this separation which permits a
space for ideal or critical projection. 
It is at a maximum in utopias, where a transcendent world, a radically
different universe, is portrayed (its most individualized form remains the
Romantic dream, wherein transcendence is represented in all its depth, even
unto its subconscious structure; but, in all cases, the separation from the real
world is maximal—it is the utopian island in contrast to the continent of the
real). 
It is diminished considerably in SF: SF only being, most often, an
extravagant projection of, but qualitatively not different from, the real world
of production. Extrapolations of mechanics or energy, velocities or powers
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approaching infinity—SF’s fundamental patterns and scenarios are those of
mechanics, of metallurgy, and so forth.  Projective hypostasis of the robot. (In
the limited universe of the pre-Industrial era, utopias counterposed an ideal
alternative world. In the potentially limitless universe of the production era,
SF adds by multiplying the world’s own possibilities.)
It is totally reduced in the implosive era of models. Models no longer
constitute an imaginary domain with reference to the real; they are, them-
selves, an apprehension of the real, and thus leave no room for any fictional
extrapolation—they are immanent, and therefore leave no room for any kind
of transcendentalism. The stage is now set for simulation, in the cybernetic
sense of the word—that is to say, for all kinds of manipulation of these models
(hypothetical scenarios, the creation of simulated situations, etc.), but now
nothing distinguishes this management-manipulation from the real itself: there
is no more fiction.
Reality was able to surpass fiction, the surest sign that the imaginary has
possibly been outpaced. But the real could never surpass the model, for the
real is only a pretext of the model. 
The imaginary was a pretext of the real in a world dominated by the reality
principle. Today, it is the real which has become the pretext of the model in
a world governed by the principle of simulation. And, paradoxically, it is the
real which has become our true utopia—but a utopia that is no longer a
possibility, a utopia we can do no more than dream about, like a lost object. 
Perhaps the SF of this era of cybernetics and hyperreality will only be able
to attempt to “artificially” resurrect the “historical” worlds of the past, trying
to reconstruct in vitro and down to its tiniest details the various episodes of
bygone days: events, persons, defunct ideologies—all now empty of meaning
and of their original essence, but hypnotic with retrospective truth. Like the
Civil War in Philip K. Dick’s The Simulacra; like a gigantic hologram in three
dimensions, where fiction will never again be a mirror held to the future, but
rather a desperate rehallucinating of the past. 
We can no longer imagine other universes; and the gift of transcendence
has been taken from us as well. Classic SF was one of expanding universes:
it found its calling in narratives of space exploration, coupled with more
terrestrial forms of exploration and colonization indigenous to the 19th and
20th centuries. There is no cause-effect relationship to be seen here. Not
simply because, today, terrestrial space has been virtually completely encoded,
mapped, inventoried, saturated; has in some sense been shrunk by globaliza-
tion; has become a collective marketplace not only for products but also for
values, signs, and models, thereby leaving no room any more for the
imaginary. It is not exactly because of all this that the exploratory universe
(technical, mental, cosmic) of SF has also stopped functioning. But the two
phenomena are closely linked, and they are two aspects of the same general
evolutionary process: a period of implosion, after centuries of explosion and
expansion. When a system reaches its limits, its own saturation point, a
reversal begins to takes place. And something happens also to the imagination.
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Until now, we have always had large reserves of the imaginary, because
the coefficient of reality is proportional to the imaginary, which provides the
former with its specific gravity. This is also true of geographical and space
exploration: when there is no more virgin ground left to the imagination, when
the map covers all the territory, something like the reality principle disap-
pears. The conquest of space constitutes, in this sense, an irreversible
threshold which effects the loss of terrestrial coordinates and referentiality.
Reality, as an internally coherent and limited universe, begins to hemorrhage
when its limits are stretched to infinity. The conquest of space, following the
conquest of the planet, promotes either the de-realizing of human space, or the
reversion of it into a simulated hyperreality. Witness, for example, this two-
room apartment with kitchen and bath launched into orbit with the last Moon
capsule (raised to the power of space, one might say); the perceived
ordinariness of a terrestrial habitat then assumes the values of the cosmic and
its hypostasis in Space, the satellization of the real in the transcendence of
Space—it is the end of metaphysics, the end of fantasy, the end of SF. The era
of hyperreality has begun.
From this point on, something must change: the projection, the extrapola-
tion, this sort of pantographic exuberance which made up the charm of SF are
now no longer possible.  It is no longer possible to manufacture the unreal
from the real, to create the imaginary from the data of reality. The process
will be rather the reverse: to put in place “decentered” situations, models of
simulation, and then to strive to give them the colors of the real, the banal,
the lived; to reinvent the real as fiction, precisely because the real has
disappeared from our lives. A hallucination of the real, of the lived, of the
everyday—but reconstituted, sometimes even unto its most disconcertingly
unusual details, recreated like an animal park or a botanical garden, presented
with transparent precision, but totally lacking substance, having been
derealized and hyperrealized. 
True SF, in this case, would not be fiction in expansion, with all the
freedom and “naïveté” which gave it a certain charm of discovery. It would,
rather, evolve implosively, in the same way as our image of the universe. It
would seek to revitalize, to reactualize, to rebanalize fragments of simula-
tion—fragments of this universal simulation which our presumed “real” world
has now become for us. 
But where can one find fictional works which already incorporate this
condition of reversion? Clearly, the short stories of Philip K. Dick “gravi-
tate,” one might say, in this new space (although it can no longer be expressed
as such because, in fact, this new universe is “anti-gravitational,” or, if it still
gravitates, it does so around the hole of the real, around the hole of the
imaginary). Dick does not create an alternate cosmos nor a folklore or a
cosmic exoticism, nor intergalactic heroic deeds; the reader is, from the
outset, in a total simulation without origin, past, or future—in a kind of flux
of all coordinates (mental, spatio-temporal, semiotic). It is not a question of
parallel universes, or double universes, or even of possible universes: not
possible nor impossible, nor real nor unreal. It is hyperreal. It is a universe
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of simulation, which is something altogether different. And this is so not
because Dick speaks specifically of simulacra. SF has always done so, but it
has always played upon the double, on artificial replication or imaginary
duplication, whereas here the double has disappeared. There is no more
double; one is always already in the other world, an other world which is not
another, without mirrors or projection or utopias as means for reflection. The
simulation is impassable, unsurpassable, checkmated, without exteriority. We
can no longer move “through the mirror” to the other side, as we could
during the golden age of transcendence. 
Perhaps an even more convincing example would be Ballard and his
fictional evolution from his earliest “fantasmagorical” short stories—poetic,
dream-like, alienating—to Crash, which (even more than High Rise or
Concrete Island) constitutes without doubt the contemporary model for this SF
which is no longer SF. Crash is our world, nothing is really “invented”
therein, everything is hyper-functional: traffic and accidents, technology and
death, sex and the camera eye. Everything is like a huge simulated and
synchronous machine; an acceleration of our own models, of all the models
which surround us, all mixed together and hyper-operationalized in the void.
What distinguishes Crash from almost all other SF, which still seem to revolve
around the old (mechanical/mechanistic) duo of function vs. dysfunction, is
that it projects into the future along the same lines of force and the same
finalities as those of the “normal” universe.  Fiction can go beyond reality (or
inversely, which is more subtle), but according to the same rules of the game.
But in Crash, there is neither fiction nor reality—a kind of hyperreality has
abolished both. And therein lies the defining character, if there is one, of our
contemporary SF. The same may be said, for example, of Bug Jack Barron
or of certain passages in Stand on Zanzibar. 
In point of fact, SF of this sort is no longer an elsewhere, it is an
everywhere: in the circulation of models here and now, in the very axiomatic
nature of our simulated environment. What SF author, for instance, would
have “imagined” (although, to be precise, this is no longer “imaginable”) the
“reality” of West German simulacra-factories, factories which rehire
unemployed people in all the roles and all the positions of the traditional
manufacturing process, but who produce nothing, whose only activity involves
chain-of-command games, competition, memos, account sheets, etc., all within
a huge network? All material production is duplicated in a void (one of these
simulacra-factories even went into “real” bankruptcy, laying off a second time
its own unemployed workers). This, indeed, is simulation: not that these
factories are fake, but that they are real—or hyperreal—and that, by being so,
they send all “real” production, that of “serious” factories, into the same
hyperreality. What is fascinating here is not the opposition of fake facto-
ries/real factories, but rather the indistinction between the two: the fact that
all the rest of production has no more referentiality or profound finality than
this “business simulacrum.” It’s the hyperrealist indifference that constitutes
the true “science-fictional” quality of this episode. And one can see that there
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is no need to invent it: it is here before us, rising out of a world without
secrets, without depth.
Doubtlessly the most difficult thing today, in the complex universe of SF,
is to be able to discern what still corresponds (and this is a large part of it) to
the imaginary of the second order, the productive/projective order, and what
is already arising from this indistinction of the imaginary, from this flux
deriving from the third order of simulation. One can, for example, clearly
discern the difference between machine robot-mechanics (characteristic of the
second order) and cybernetic machines like computers which derive axiomati-
cally from the third. But one order can easily contaminate the other, and the
computer can very well function like a supermachine, a super-robot, a
mechanical superpower: exhibiting the productive genius of the simulacra of
the second order, not following the processes of pure simulation, and still
bearing witness of the reflexes of a finalized universe (including ambivalence
and revolt, like the computer in 2001 or Shalmanezer in Stand on Zanzibar). 
Between the operatic (the theatrical status, fantastic machinery, the “grand
Opera” of technology), which corresponds to the first order, the operative (the
industrial status, production and execution of power and energy), which
corresponds to the second order, and the operational (the cybernetic status,
uncertainty, the flux of the “meta-technological”), which corresponds to the
third order, all kinds of interferences can be produced today within the SF
genre. But only the last order should be of any genuine interest to us. 
2. Ballard’s Crash
From the classical (and even the cybernetic) viewpoint, technology is an
extension of the body. It is the evolved functional capacity of a human
organism which allows it both to rival Nature and to triumphantly remold it
in its own image. From Marx to McLuhan, one sees the same instrumentalist
vision of machines and of language: relays, extensions, media-mediators of a
Nature destined ideally to become the organic body. In this “rational” view,
the body itself is only a medium. 
Inversely, in its baroque and apocalyptic treatment in Crash, technology
is the deadly deconstruction of the body—no longer a functional medium, but
an extension of death: dismemberment and mutilation, not in the pejorative
vision of a lost unity of subject (which is still the perspective of psychoanaly-
sis) but in the explosive vision of a body given over to “symbolic wounds,”
a body commixed with technology’s capacity for violation and violence and
in the brutal surgery that it continually performs in creating incisions,
excisions, scar tissue, gaping body holes—of which sexual wounds and sensual
pleasures are only a case in point (and the mechanical servitude in the
workplace, the palliated caricature)—a body with neither organs nor organ 
pleasures, entirely dominated by gash marks, excisions, and technical
scars—all under the gleaming sign of a sexuality that is without referentiality
and without limits. 
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Her mutilation and death became a coronation of her image at the hands of a
colliding technology, a celebration of her individual limbs and facial planes,
gestures and skin tones.  Each of the spectators at the accident site would carry
away an image of the violent transformation of this woman, of the complex
wounds that fused together her own sexuality and the hard technology of the
automobile.  Each of them would join his own imagination, the tender
membranes of his mucous surfaces, his groves of erectile tissue, to the wounds
of this minor actress through the medium of his own motorcar, touching them
as he drove in a medley of stylized postures. Each would place his lips on
those bleeding apertures...press his eyelids against the exposed tendon of her
forefinger, the dorsal surface of his erect penis against the ruptured lateral
walls of her vagina.  The automobile crash had made possible the final and
longed-for union of the actress and the members of her audience. (§20:189-90)1
The technological is never grasped except by (auto) accident, in other words
by the violence done to itself and the violence done to the body. It is all
identical: all shocks, all collisions, all impacts, all the metallurgy of accidents
is inscribed in a semiurgy of the body—not in anatomy or physiology, but in
a semiurgy of contusions, scars, mutilations, and wounds which are like new
sexual organs opened in the body.  Thus, the codifying of the body as
workforce in the order of production is replaced by the dispersion of the body
as anagram in the order of mutilation. Gone are the “erogenous zones”:
everything becomes a hole for reflex discharges. But above all (as in primitive
initiatory tortures, unlike our own), the entire body becomes a sign which
offers itself in the exchange of body language. Bodies and technology each
diffracting through the other their own frantic symbols. Carnal abstractions
and designs. 
There is no affectivity behind all this: no psychology, no ambivalence or
desire, no libido or death-drive. Death is a natural implication in this limitless
exploration of the possible forms of violence done to the body, but this is
never (as in sadism or masochism) what the violence purposely and perversely
aims at, never a distortion of sense and sex (in comparison to what?). There
is no repressed unconscious (affective or representational) therein, except via
a second reading which would necessarily reinject still more twisted meaning
in order to conform to the psychoanalytical model. The nonsensicalness, the
brutality, of this mixture of body and technology is totally immanent—it is the
reversion of one into the other. And an unprecedented sort of sexuality results
from this, a kind of potential dizziness linked to the pure inscription of the
body’s non-existent signs: a ritual symbolism of incisions and brands, like in
the graffiti of the subways of New York. 
Another point in common: in Crash, the reader needs no longer to contend
with accidental signs that would appear only on the margins of the system.
The Accident portrayed here is no longer the haphazard bricolage that it still
is in most highway accidents—the bricolage of the new leisure class’s death
drive. The car is not the appendix of an immobile domestic universe: there are
no more private and domestic universes, only figures of incessant circulation,
and the Accident is everywhere as irreversible and fundamental trope, the
banalizing of the anomaly of death. It is no longer on the margins; it is at the
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heart. It is no longer the exception to a triumphant rationality; it has become
the Rule, it has devoured the Rule. It’s not even any longer the “accursed
part,” the part conceded to fate by the system itself and calculated into its
general reckoning. All is inverted. Here it is the Accident which gives life its
very form; it is the Accident, the irrational, which is the sex of life. And the
automobile itself—this magnetized sphere which ends up creating an entire
universe of tunnels, expressways, overpasses, on and off ramps by treating its
mobile cockpit as a universal prototype—is only an immense metaphor of the
same. 
There is no possibility of dysfunction in the universe of the accident; thus
no perversion either. The Accident, like death, is no longer of the order of the
neurotic, of the repressed, of the residual, or of the transgressive; it is the
initiator of a new manner of non-perverted pleasure (contrary to what the
author himself says in his introduction when he speaks of a new perverse
logic, one must resist the moral temptation of reading Crash as perversion),
of a strategic reorganization of life beyond the perspective of death. Death,
wounds, mutilations are no longer metaphors for castration—it’s exactly the
reverse, or even more than the reverse. Only fetishist metaphors are
perversion: seduction by the model, by the interposed fetish, or by the
medium of language. Here, death and sex are read straight from the body,
without fantasy, without metaphor, without phraseology—in contrast, for
example, to the Machine in Kafka’s The Penal Colony, where the body, via
its wounds, is still the locus of textual inscription. Therefore, on the one hand,
the machine of Kafka is still puritanical, repressive, “a signifying machine”
as Deleuze would say, whereas the technology of Crash is glistening and
seductive, or unpolished and innocent. Seductive because it has been stripped
of meaning, a simple mirror of torn bodies. And the body of Vaughan is
likewise a mirror of twisted chrome, crumpled fenders, and semen-tarnished
sheet-metal. Bodies and technology fused, seduced, inextricable one from the
other.
As Vaughan turned the car into a filling station courtyard the scarlet light from
the neon sign over the portico flared across these grainy photographs of
appalling injuries: the breasts of teenage girls deformed by instrument
binnacles, the partial mammoplasties of elderly housewives carried out by the
chromium louvres of windshield assemblies, nipples sectioned by manufactur-
ers’ dashboard medallions; injuries to male and female genitalia caused by
steering wheel shrouds, windshields during ejection...photographs of mutilated
penises, sectioned vulvas and crushed testicles passed through the flaring
light....In several of the photographs the source of the wound was indicated by
a detail of that portion of the car which caused the injury: beside a casualty
ward photograph of a bifurcated penis was an inset of a handbrake unit; above
a close-up of a massively bruised vulva was a steering-wheel boss and its
manufacturer’s medallion. These unions of torn genitalia and sections of car
body and instrument panel formed a series of disturbing modules, units in a
new currency of pain and desire. (§14:134)
Every gash mark, every bruise, every scar left on the body is an artificial
invagination, like those of the ritual scarrings of aborigines which serve as a
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vehement answer to the absence of body. Only the wounded body can exist
symbolically, for itself and for others; “sexual desire” is nothing but this
possibility of bodies to mix and exchange their signifiers. And these few
natural orifices which we are accustomed to associate with sex and sexual
activities are nothing in comparison to all these potential wounds, to all these
artificial orifices (but why “artificial”?), to all these openings through which
the body turns itself inside out and, like certain topologies, no longer
possesses an inside or an outside. Sex, as conceived here, is only an inferior
and specialized definition comprising all the symbolic and sacrificial practices
that a body can open itself up to—not via nature, but via artifice, simulation,
and accident. Sex is no more than the rarefaction of a drive called desire in
pre-prepared zones. It is largely surpassed by the wide range of symbolic
wounds which, in a sense, are the “anagrammatization” of sex over the entire
body. But then, of course, it is no longer sex; it is something else. Sex itself
is only the inscription of a privileged signifier and of a few secondary
marks—nothing in comparison to all the marks and wounds that a body is
capable of.  
Aborigines knew how to use their entire bodies toward this end through
tatooing, torture, and initiatory rites: sexuality was only one of the many
possible metaphors of this symbolic exchange, and neither the most meaning-
ful nor the most prestigious (as it has become for us, in its realist and
obsessional referentiality, because of our organic and functional treatment of
it, including orgasms). 
As the car travelled for the first time at twenty miles an hour Vaughan drew
his fingers from the girl’s vulva and anus, rotated his hips and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Headlamps flared above us as the stream of cars moved
up the slope of the overpass. In the rear-view mirror I could still see Vaughan
and the girl, their bodies lit by the car behind, reflected in the black trunk of
the Lincoln and a hundred points of the interior trim. In the chromium ashtray
I saw the girl’s left breast and erect nipple. In the vinyl window gutter I saw
deformed sections of Vaughan’s thighs and her abdomen forming a bizarre
anatomical junction. Vaughan lifted the young woman astride him, his penis
entering her vagina again. In a triptych of images reflected in the speedometer,
the clock and the revolution counter, the sexual act between Vaughan and this
young woman took place in the hooded grottoes of these luminescent dials,
moderated by the surging needle of the speedometer....As I propelled the car
at fifty miles an hour along the open deck of the overpass Vaughan arched his
back and lifted the young woman into the full glare of the headlamps behind
us. Her sharp breasts flashed within the chromium and glass cage of the
speeding car. Vaughan’s strong pelvic spasms coincided with the thudding
passage of the lamp standards anchored in the overpass at hundred-yard
intervals. As each one approached his hips kicked into the girl, driving his
penis into her vagina, his hands splaying her buttocks to reveal her anus as the
yellow light filled the car. (§15:143) 
Here, all the erotic vocabulary is technical: not ass, prick, or cunt, but anus,
rectum, penis, vulva.  No slang, no intimacy in the sexual violence, only
functional language: equivalency of chrome and mucous membranes. And it
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is the same with the congruity of death and sex: rather than being described
with pleasure, they are melded together into a kind of highly technical
construct. No sexual pleasure, just discharge, plain and simple.  And the
copulations and semen which fill this book have no more sensual value than
the outlines of wounds have the value of violence, even metaphorical. They
are only signatures. (In the final scene, the narrator imprints a number of
wrecked cars with his semen-soaked hand.) 
Sexual pleasure (perverse or not) has always been mediated by a technical
apparatus, by a mechanical process, of real objects but most often of fantasies;
it always involves an intermediary manipulation of scenes or gadgets. Here,
sexual pleasure is only climax; in other words, it operates on the same wave-
length as the violence of a technical apparatus; the two are homogenized by
technology and encapsulated into one object: the automobile. 
We had entered an immense traffic jam. From the junction of the motorway
and Western Avenue to the ascent ramp of the flyover the traffic lanes were
packed with vehicles, windshields leaching out the molten colours of the sun
setting above the western suburbs of London. Brake-lights flared in the evening
air, glowing in the huge pool of cellulosed bodies. Vaughan sat with one arm
out of the passenger window. He slapped the door impatiently, pounding the
panel with his fist. To our right the high wall of a double-decker airline coach
formed a cliff of faces. The passengers at the windows resembled rows of the
dead looking down at us from the galleries of a columbarium. The enormous
energy of the twentieth century, enough to drive the planet into a new orbit
around a happier star, was being expended to maintain this immense motionless
pause. (§17:151)
Around me, down the entire length of Western Avenue, along both ramps of
the flyover, stretched an immense congestion of traffic held up by the accident.
Standing in the centre of this paralyzed hurricane, I felt completely at ease, as
if my obsessions with the endlessly multiplying vehicles had at last been
relieved. (§17:156)
However, there exists another dimension in Crash which is inseparable
from those mixing the technical and the sexual (united in this mourning-less
work of death): the dimension of photography and cinema. The shining,
saturated surface of traffic patterns and accidents is without depth, but it
always takes on depth in the lens of Vaughan’s movie camera. He collects and
classifies stills of accidents, like ID cards. The continual rehearsal of the
crucial event that he is plotting (his automotive death and the simulated death
of the movie star Elizabeth Taylor in a crash involving her, a crash meticu-
lously simulated and perfected during the course of months) takes place within
the focus of the cinematographic. This universe would be nothing without this
hyper-realistic detached long-shot viewing angle. The added depth and the
raising of the visual medium to the second order can, by itself, suffice to fuse
together technology, sex, and death.  But in fact, the photo here is neither a
medium nor an order of representation. It is neither a “supplementary”
abstraction of the image, nor a compulsion for spectacle, and the position of
Vaughan is never that of a voyeur or a pervert. The roll of film (like
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transistorized music in cars and apartments) is part of the universal film of
life, hyperreal, metallic, and corporal, made up of movement and flux. The
photo is no more a medium than is the technology or the body—all are
simultaneous in this universe where the anticipation of an event coincides with
its reproduction, and even with its “real” occurrence. Depth of time is
abolished as well: much like the past, the future ceases to exist. Actually, it
is the camera-eye which replaces time, along with all other expressions of
depth like affectivity, space, language. It is not an alternate dimension; it
simply signifies that this universe is without secrets. 
The mannequin rider sat well back, the onrushing air lifting his chin. His
hands were shackled to the handlebars like a kamikaze pilot’s. His long thorax
was plastered with metering devices. In front of him, their expressions equally
vacant, the family of four manniquins sat in their vehicle. Their faces were
marked with cryptic symbols. 
A harsh whipping noise came towards us, the sound of the metering coils
skating across the grass beside the rail. There was a violent metal explosion as
the motorcycle struck the front of the saloon car. The two vehicles veered
sideways towards the line of startled spectators. I regained my balance,
involuntarily holding Vaughan’s shoulder, as the motorcycle and its driver
sailed over the bonnet of the car and struck the windshield, then careened
across the roof in a black mass of fragments. The car plunged ten feet back on
its hawsers. It came to rest astride the rails. The bonnet, windshield and roof
had been crushed by the impact. Inside the cabin, the lopsided family lurched
across each other, the decapitated torso of the front-seat woman passenger
embedded in the fractured windshield. 
The engineers waved to the crowd reassuringly and moved towards the
motorcycle, which lay in its side fifty yards behind the car. They began to pick
up the sections of the cyclist’s body, tucking the legs and head under their
arms. Shavings of fibreglass from its face and shoulders speckled the glass
around the test car like silver snow, a death confetti.... 
Helen Remington held my arm. She smiled at me, nodding encouragingly
as if urging a child across some mental hurdle. ` We can have a look at it again
on the Ampex. They’re showing it in slow-motion. (§13:124-25) 
In Crash, everything is hyper-functional: traffic and accidents, technology
and death, sex and simulation are all like one single, huge synchronous
machine.  It is the same universe as the hyper-market, where merchandise
becomes hyper-merchandise—in other words, it and the entire atmosphere
surrounding it are always already caught up in the continuous figures of
circulation. But at the same time, the functionalism of Crash devours its own
rationality, since it does not treat the dysfunctional. It is a radicalized
functionalism, a functionalism that reaches its paradoxal limits and then burns
them away. Thus, it becomes an undefinable object, and hence fascinating.
Not good, not bad: ambivalent. Like death or fashion, it becomes a short-cut
(in contrast to the good old functionalism which, even while much debated,
is no longer one at all); in other words, a more rapid road than the main
highway, or going where the main highway doesn’t go, or, better yet (to
parody Littré in a pataphysical manner2) “a road going nowhere, but going
there faster than the others.”
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This is what distinguishes Crash from most other SF works; the latter still
seem to revolve around the same old duo of function/dysfunction, which they
project into the future along the same lines of force and the same finalities as
that of the normal universe. Fiction going beyond reality (or the inverse), but
according to the same rules of the game. In Crash, there is neither fiction nor
reality—a kind of hyper-reality has abolished both. Even critical regression is
no longer possible. This mutating and commutating world of simulation and
death, this violently sexualized world totally lacking in desire, full of violent
and violated bodies but curiously neutered, this chromatic and intensely
metallic world empty of the sensorial, a world of hyper-technology without
finality—is it good or bad? We can’t say. It is simply fascinating, without this
fascination implying any kind of value judgment whatsoever. And this is the
miracle of Crash. The moral gaze—the critical judgmentalism that is still a
part of the old world’s functionality—cannot touch it. Crash is hypercritical,
in the sense of being beyond the critical (and even beyond its own author,
who, in the introduction, speaks of this novel as “cautionary, a warning
against that brutal, erotic and overlit realm that beckons more and more
persuasively to us from the margins of the technological landscape”:
Introduction to Crash 6). Few books, few films attain this level of absence of
all finality and critical negativity, this unpolished splendor of ordinariness and
violence: Nashville, A Clockwork Orange.
After Borges, but in a totally different register, Crash is the first great
novel of the universe of simulation, the world that we will be dealing with
from now on: a non-symbolic universe but one which, by a kind of reversal
of its mass-mediated substance (neon, concrete, cars, mechanical eroticism),
seems truly saturated with an intense initiatory power. 
   The last of the ambulances drove away, its siren wailing. The spectators returned
to their cars, or climbed the embankment to break in the wire fence. An adolescent
girl in a denim suit walked past us, her young man with an arm around her waist.
He held her right breast with the back of his hand, stroking her nipple with his
knuckles. They stepped into a beach buggy slashed with pennants and yellow paint
and drove off, horn tooting eccentrically....This pervasive sexuality filled the air,
as if we were members of a congregation leaving after a sermon urging us to
celebrate our sexualities with friends and strangers, and were driving into the night
to imitate the bloody eucharist we had observed with the most unlikely partners.
(§17:157)
NOTES (by ABE)
1. J.G. Ballard. Crash. NY: Vintage Books, 1985.  Reprint of the first edition
(NY: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1973) plus author’s introduction, which originally
appeared in the first French edition (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1974).
2. Littré: a respected French dictionary. Pataphysical: referring to Pataphysics, a
parodic pseudo-science invented by the French satirist Alfred Jarry, who defined it as
“the science of that which is superinduced upon metaphysics, whether within or beyond
the latter’s limitation....Pataphysics will examine the laws governing exceptions and
will explain the universe supplementary to this one; or, less ambitiously, will describe
a universe that can be—and perhaps should be—envisaged in the place of the traditional
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one....Pataphysics is the science of imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes
the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their lineaments.” (Roger
Shattuck & Simon Tayler, eds., Selected Works of Alfred Jarry. NY: Grove Press,
1965, pp. 192-93).
RÉSUMÉS
Jean Baudrillard. Simulacres et science-fiction.—Dans l’ordre hyperréel des
simulacres qui est dirigé par des systèmes de contrôle informatiques et
cybernétiques, la réalité est de plus en plus déterminée par des modèles (plutôt
que l’inverse). La distance qui sépare la réel (les faits) et l’imaginaire (la
fiction) disparaît, et avec elle l’espace discursif traditionnel utilisé par les
utopies et la SF classique. La SF ne peut plus fournir un modèle imaginaire
du réel parce que celui-ci est déjà, lui-même, un produit des modèles. Le
nouveau rôle de la SF est de représenter cet effacement de la distance entre
la fiction et les faits. (ICR/ABE)
Jean Baudrillard. Crash de Ballard.—Le roman Crash de Ballard renverse la
perspective traditionnelle de la technologie comme extension fonctionnelle du
corps. Dans Crash, corps et technologie se mêlent (littéralement and
métaphoriquement) en une symbolisation générale et sans psychologie,
symbolisation de la violence et de la mutilation érotique, exemplifiée par
l’auto-accident/ l’accident d’auto. Des véhicules organiques et inorganiques
se pénétrent l’un l’autre, créant un lieu de puissance initiatique ainsi qu’une
voie de ritualisation pour les objects médiateurs de masse. La roman Crash
représente donc la SF comme hyperréalité virtuelle où la dynamique de
l’implosion remplace celles de l’extrapolation. (ICR/ABE)
Abstract.—In the hyperreal order of simulations, which is governed by
informatic and cybernetic control systems, reality is increasingly determined
by models (rather than the reverse). The distance deparating the real (fact) and
the imaginary (fiction) collapses, and with it the discursive space traditionally
used by utopias and classical SF. SF can no longer supply an imaginary model
of the real because the latter, itself, is the product of models. SF is now called
upon to portray this breakdown of the distance between fiction and fact. (ICR)
Abstract.—Ballard’s Crash inverts the traditional view of technology as a
functional extension of the body. The body and technology mingle (both
literally and metaphorically) in a generalized psychology-free symbolization of
violence and erotic mutilation exemplified by the auto (auto-) accident.
Organic and inorganic vehicles interpenetrate, creating a locus of initiatory
power and a path of ritualization for mass-mediated objects. Crash thus
represents SF as virtual hyperreality where the dynamics of implosion replace
those of extrapolation. (ICR)
